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Evidence Law: 






Does overreliance upon circumstantial evidence lead to wrongful 
convictions?  Do fact-finders generally—and jurors in particular—tend 
to overvalue such forms of proof?  The law tends to assume so, but 
recent behavioral studies suggest the contrary: The human tendency is 
to undervalue circumstantial evidence when compared to direct 
evidence, even when there is no rational reason to do so.  Surveying 
three forms of cognitive biases—the anti-inference bias, gain-framed 
inference, and the source-content bias—this chapter demonstrates why 
the fear of overreliance upon circumstantial evidence by fact-finders 




The legal literature is divided on the precise distinction between 
circumstantial and direct evidence.  Some have gone so far as to argue 
that there is no real difference between the two: with some effort  
and creativity, all evidence may be classified as circumstantial.2  
Nonetheless, the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence 
is commonplace in both legal literature and in the public perception of 
proof.  Dean John Henry Wigmore defined the distinction as follows:  
 
When we speak of a fact as established by direct or positive 
evidence, we mean that it has been testified to by witnesses as 
having come under the cognizance of their senses, and of the 
truth of which there seems to be no reasonable doubt or 
question; and when we speak of a fact as established by 
circumstantial evidence, we mean that the existence of it is 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Binyamin Blum & Elisha Harlev, 
Convicting Based on Circumstantial Evidence: Psychological Insights 
Regarding the Appropriate Decision-making Model in Light of the Kriaf Case, 
11 DIN UDVARIM 161 (2018). 
 2. See, e.g., Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of 
Direct Evidence, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1806–07 (2009).  
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fairly and reasonably to be inferred from other facts proved in 
the case.3 
 
Put differently, unlike direct evidence, which proves a material 
element of a legal action, circumstantial evidence proves other facts 
from which one may infer the existence of material elements.  For 
example, a witness’s testimony that he saw the defendant shoot the 
victim would be direct evidence of the actus reus of murder.  By 
contrast, a different witness’s testimony that she saw the defendant 
fleeing the crime scene shortly after she heard gunshots would be 
circumstantial evidence. 
Though the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence 
is widely accepted, the common law does not discriminate between the 
two in terms of their weight.4  A criminal conviction may rely solely 
upon circumstantial evidence.  As Wigmore observed, “circumstantial 
evidence may be as persuasive and as compelling as testimonial 
evidence, and sometimes more so.”5 
Indeed, there is no a priori reason to classify circumstantial 
evidence as probatively inferior, or to suspect that it leads to less 
accurate outcomes than direct evidence.  On the contrary, some studies 
have demonstrated that certain kinds of circumstantial evidence are 
more accurate—and therefore lead to fewer wrongful convictions—
than direct evidence.  For instance, one study found that 68% of known 
wrongful convictions stemmed from direct evidence, whereas only 9% 
relied on circumstantial evidence.6 
Still, the common law has traditionally displayed a fear that 
circumstantial evidence may lead juries astray and result in wrongful 
convictions.  Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw famously observed:  
 
The disadvantages [of circumstantial evidence] are, that a jury 
has not only to weigh the evidence of facts, but to draw just 
conclusions from them; in doing which, they may be led by 
prejudice or partiality, or by want of due deliberation and 
sobriety of judgment, to make hasty and false deductions; a 
                                                 
 3. 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 
25, at 954 (1983). 
 4. Id. § 26, at 957. 
 5. Id. § 26, at 961. 
 6. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 56–58 (1987). 
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source of error not existing in the consideration of positive 
evidence.7  
 
In his seminal work Convicting the Innocent, Edwin Borchard 
asserted that circumstantial evidence was one of the leading causes of 
wrongful convictions.8  Though Borchard conceded that “[n]o one will 
suggest that circumstantial evidence should be excluded as a form of 
evidence,” he observed that it is “nevertheless, often misleading and 
unreliable.”9  The California Supreme Court similarly observed over 
half a century ago that “Courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct on 
how to evaluate circumstantial evidence if the prosecution substantially 
relies on circumstantial evidence to establish any element of the 
case.”10  No similar duty attaches when the prosecution relies on direct 
evidence.  Fears of overreliance upon circumstantial evidence are 
reflected to this day in California’s jury instructions.  Jurors are urged 
to exercise particular caution when relying solely upon circumstantial 
evidence: “Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude 
that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you 
must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to 
that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.”11  All these admonitions 
are based on the assumption that fact-finders are likely to overvalue 
circumstantial evidence. 
Psychological research demonstrates, however, that fact-finders 
tend to attach lesser weight to circumstantial than to direct evidence.12  
Empirically, therefore, there seems be little to justify the fear of 
excessive weight being given to circumstantial evidence.  On the 
contrary, jurors tend to be categorically skeptical of such evidence—
sometimes unjustifiably so.  We now turn to three sources of cognitive 




                                                 
 7. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 312 (1850). 
 8. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE xiv (1932). 
 9. Id. 
 10. People v. Yrigoyen, 45 Cal. 2d 46, 49 (1955). 
 11. Judicial Council of Cal., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 224, 225 
(2006). 
 12. Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial 
Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 241 (2006). 
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Anti-Inference Bias 
 
A series of recent behavioral studies has demonstrated that 
decisionmakers avoid ascribing responsibility—civil or criminal—
when evidence of wrongdoing is solely circumstantial.  This finding 
has held true even when the objective weight of the circumstantial 
evidence was equal to or greater than that of direct evidence.13  In one 
study, participants were asked whether they would convict a person of 
speeding based on two different speed-camera technologies: the one 
recorded the car’s speed in a single shot (direct evidence); the other 
was a system of two close cameras that recorded the car’s location with 
a precise time stamp, requiring an inference of the car’s average speed 
(circumstantial evidence).  The error rate for both technologies was 
held constant and minimal (2%) in both groups.  The speeding figures 
were also identical in both cases: 125 kilometers per hour (78 mph) on 
a stretch of road limited to 100 kilometers per hour (62 mph).  Though 
there was no rational reason to prefer a conviction based on one 
technology over the other, the participants largely preferred the direct 
evidence: 81.4% would convict based on direct evidence, while only 
60% would convict based on circumstantial evidence.14 
Numerous explanations have been offered for this anti-inference 
bias, such as the ease of imagining alternative scenarios.15  However, 
recent studies have shown that the reluctance to rely on circumstantial 
evidence is powerful even when an alternative, exculpatory scenario is 
virtually unimaginable.16  In other words, the very demand to make a 
logical inference in the absence of direct evidence is what decreases the 
likelihood of conviction, regardless of the strength of the circumstantial 




The fear of false convictions based on circumstantial evidence is 
further reduced by a phenomenon known as “gain-framed inference”: 
The anti-inference bias diminishes when a decision is framed as a gain 
                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir et al., Seeing is Believing: The Anti-Inference 
Bias, 89 IND. L.J. 195, 204–15 (2014). 
 14. Id. at 204–07. 
 15. Keith E. Niedermeier et al., Jurors’ Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: 
Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect, 76 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCH. 533, 533 (1999). 
 16. See Zamir et al., supra n.13, at 195. 
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rather than as a loss.17  A recent study included a scenario in which a 
dairy farmer supplied milk with an unusual percentage of protein.  
Some of the participants were told that the protein percentage was 
high—and that the milk was therefore of higher quality and more 
expensive (“gain condition”).  Other participants were told that the 
protein percentage was low—and therefore entailed a price reduction 
(“loss condition”).  Both groups were further divided by the kinds of 
evidence pointing to the milk’s protein content: some were given direct 
evidence while others were provided with circumstantial evidence.  In 
this experiment too, the error rate was held constant, providing no 
rational basis for distinction.  While the overall anti-inference bias 
displayed by participants was consistent with prior findings of anti-
inference bias, participants displayed a stronger anti-interference bias in 
the “loss condition” than in the “gain condition.”18 
The phenomenon of gain-framed inference seems applicable to 
criminal cases too.  In a legal system that considers wrongful 
convictions to be far worse than wrongful acquittals, an inference 
leading to an acquittal of a potentially innocent defendant should be 
perceived as a gain.  Therefore, at least theoretically, this should lead to 
greater willingness to rely on inferences that establish the innocence of 
the accused when compared to their conviction, thereby reducing the 
number of convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence.19 
Still, the phenomenon of gain-framed inference has not yet been 
fully studied or understood.  The existing studies warrant caution, not 
bold conclusions.  Further, the assumption that acquittals are in fact 
perceived as a gain rather than a loss has not yet been substantiated.  
For these reasons, more research is needed to establish that the 
phenomenon of gain-framed inference helps explain why fact-finders 
are reluctant to find guilt based solely on circumstantial evidence. 
 
Negative Inferences: The Source-Content Bias 
 
When considering circumstantial evidence, fact-finders—whether 
lay adjudicators or professional judges—often consider the plausibility 
of alternative scenarios suggested by the defense.  The relevant 
psychological phenomenon for evaluating this thought process is the 
                                                 
 17. Eyal Zamir et al., New Evidence About Circumstantial Evidence, 41 L. 
& PSYCH. REV. 107 (2017). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, 
and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 171 (2012). 
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“source-content bias.”20  In a recent experiment that tested this bias, 
participants proved reluctant to infer negative conclusions, i.e., that 
something did not happen.  When relying on circumstantial evidence, 
the inference that a certain fact was incorrect was less likely than the 
inference that a fact was correct. 
Participants in the experiment were asked to consider a scenario 
whereby a car was parked by its owner in the morning in a particular 
location.  After being told that cars are occasionally stolen, one group 
of participants was asked whether the car was not stolen, and the other 
group was asked whether the car was still in its original location.  
Surprisingly, the study found that participants were far more 
likely to infer that the car was in the same location than they were to 
infer that the car had not been stolen.21  It is worth emphasizing that if 
the car had been stolen it would—by definition—no longer be parked 
in the same place.  There was therefore no rational basis to agree with 
the statement that the car was still at the same place more than with 
the statement that it was not stolen.  Moreover, the likelihood of the 
car remaining where it was parked was actually lower than the chance 
that it was not stolen, since there are other imaginable causes apart 
from theft (such as towing) that would relocate the car. 
The source-content bias may cause fact-finders to exercise 
particular caution when asked to evaluate whether the defendant’s 
account is unimaginable.  Still, much like the gain-framed inference 
bias, the source-content bias has not yet been thoroughly studied in the 
legal context.  Extension to the legal context is therefore tentative.  But 
although further research is necessary, the source-content bias may bear 
significance when considering fears of wrongful convictions based on 




Recent behavioral studies suggest that fears of overreliance on 
circumstantial evidence may be overblown.  The thoroughly studied 
anti-inference bias suggests that fact-finders are already highly 
reluctant to draw conclusions from circumstantial evidence.  Though 
we are only beginning to fully appreciate the robustness of two other 
kinds of bias that may lead jurors to treat circumstantial evidence with 
circumspection—the source-content bias and gain-framed inferences—
                                                 
 20. John Turri, Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias, 39 COGNITIVE 
SCI. 307 (2015). 
 21. Id. at 312–16. 
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initial findings suggest that these phenomena may also lead fact-finders 
to acquit.  Findings from the Innocence Project confirm that it is often 
direct rather than circumstantial evidence that has led to wrongful 
convictions.  The focus, therefore, on circumstantial evidence as a 
central cause of wrongful convictions appears to be misguided.  The 
effort to combat wrongful convictions must therefore shift focus to the 
inherent flaws of direct forms of evidence—such as eyewitness 
misidentification and false confessions.  It is there, rather than with 
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